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Reconciling IMF rules and international investment agreements: 






There is currently no universal framework governing capital controls. As a result, a conflict has 
arisen due to the different approaches taken by various international organizations and many 
international investment agreements (IIAs). In particular, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
-- established to manage the international financial system -- preserves national autonomy over 
capital controls when such measures are deemed necessary; in contrast, IIAs, and especially 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) -- crafted primarily to protect investors -- typically do not 
allow for the imposition of restrictions on capital outflows associated with foreign investments 
for balance-of-payments reasons. 
 
More specifically, countries that significantly limit the policy space for capital controls in their 
IIAs (that is, do not allow for a balance-of-payments derogation) can potentially come in direct 
conflict with the IMF. For instance, a senior IMF lawyer, expressing concern that this approach 
might be contrary to a request by the Fund that a government adopt capital controls, observed 
that there is a risk that, “in complying with its obligations [under Free Trade Agreements] … a 
member could be rendered ineligible to use the Fund’s resources under the Fund’s articles.”
1
 
Recent volatile capital flows to developing countries, as well as the greater acceptance of capital 
controls today, make it likely that this issue will stay on the international agenda. This dilemma 
                                                                 
*
 Elizabeth L. Broomfield (ebroomfield@cgsh.com) is an associate at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. The author 
would like to thank Sergey Ripinsky, Diana Rosert, Manfred Schekulin and two anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful peer reviews. The views expressed by the author of this Perspective do not necessarily reflect the 
opinions of Columbia University or its partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives (ISSN 2158-3579) 
is a peer-reviewed series. 
1
 Deborah E. Siegel, “Using free trade agreements to control capital account restrictions: Summary of remarks on 
the relationship to the mandate of the IMF,” International Law Student Association Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, vol. 10 (2004), p. 301. 
 2





In response to this issue, IIAs should incorporate derogations for countries when treaty 
obligations conflict with IMF recommendations. More specifically, if and when the IMF 
suggests that a government employ capital controls for a limited time to respond to severe 
economic hardship, the employing country would have a complete defense against investor 
lawsuits under IIAs incorporating such derogations. 
 
This recommendation may be more politically palatable than other proposed derogations that 
might afford greater discretion to treaty parties in the implementation of capital controls and 
therefore should be the most politically feasible. Moreover, the IMF has the preeminent role in 
international economic rule-making on this issue; the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
defers to IMF authority on the question of transfer restrictions and some countries have already 
demonstrated a willingness to rely on IMF judgment on this subject: the North American Free 
Trade Agreement’s balance-of-payments derogation relies upon IMF statistical information and 
recommendations. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has even advocated a greater role 




This proposal could be especially useful for US IIAs and the US Model BIT; the US has been 
particularly reluctant to incorporate any derogation for capital controls into its IIAs. This plan 
offers several advantages over the potential balance-of-payments derogation currently debated by 
the US State Department. First, an IMF exemption could allow controls to prevent a crisis from 
escalating, rather than addressing problems purely retrospectively; this problem has already 
occurred regarding the NAFTA balance-of-payments exception. Though permission to use 
capital controls in this manner would likely be extremely rare, the possibility may prevent a 
costly and potentially unnecessary buildup of reserves, as occurred in Mexico.
4
 The requirement 
of an IMF recommendation to use controls would also limit abuse of the flexibility by host 
countries. It is also more objective and therefore promotes legal predictability, as the existence of 
a balance-of-payments crisis can be subjective. A country may be threatened with lawsuits even 
if it believes capital controls are needed to respond to a clear balance-of-payments dilemma; IMF 
permission to impose capital controls would remove this uncertainty. If the IMF states that 
capital controls are needed to address a financial difficulty, a country may proceed without fear 
of lawsuits. 
 
Most importantly, this proposed derogation would directly address the IMF’s concern that its 
authority to recommend capital controls could be undermined by IIAs. While rules of 
international institutions are carefully designed to ensure that they do not create conflicting 
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obligations, this is not the case for most treaties crafted in the investment area. Currently, it is 
possible that a country in crisis will have to face two potentially conflicting international 
obligations: an IMF recommendation to employ capital controls, and IIAs that allow investors to 
sue if controls are imposed. A simple derogation in IIAs would remove this risk and enhance the 
compatibility of such agreements with international rule-making. 
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